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ABSTRACT 
In this Article we discuss how U.S. entity law has evolved in recent 
decades so that (i) limited liability has become available to the owners of 
any form of business organization, and (ii) all forms of business 
organizations are now seen as having the status of entities separate from 
their owners. Those changes have occurred without significant 
consideration of their consequences or what they mean for the public 
policies underlying entity law. At the same time, there is an increasing 
awareness by businesses that promotion of social benefits and/or reduction 
of externalities is in the firm’s best interests. There has recently been 
development of hybrid business models, but they have been driven by 
pragmatic concerns rather than an understanding of the theoretical 
underpinnings for, and restrictions on, those models. This Article strives 
to point the way toward a new understanding of how the state should frame 
the requirements for limited liability and separate entity status. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The principal characteristic that traditionally distinguished a 
business corporation from any other form of entity organized under state 
law was the limited liability provided to its shareholders. Section 6.22(b) 
of the Model Business Corporation Act states, “a shareholder of a 
corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation 
except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or 
conduct.”1 Until the enactment of the first limited liability company statute 
in Wyoming in 1977,2 no other form of entity that could be created under 
state law provided equivalent liability protection for every owner of an 
entity. 
While limited liability has obvious value to the shareholders by 
giving them the comfort of knowing they have at risk only what they have 
chosen to invest in the corporation, it also has an obvious detriment for 
those dealing with the corporation because they are limited to looking only 
to the corporation’s assets for amounts they may be owed. The benefits 
and detriments of limited liability have led commentators to take opposite 
sides of the question whether limited liability is socially beneficial and 
should be retained. We survey that debate briefly in Part I. 
Related to the corporate characteristic of limited liability was the 
status of a corporation as a separate entity distinct from its owners. The 
burden for that separateness was an extra layer of taxation, and the benefit 
was the right to act as a separate person.3 Those characteristics were in 
stark contrast to the way business forms that were not corporations were 
seen—as aggregates of their owners, passing through income and risk to 
the individuals,4 rather than as separate entities. But, as with limited 
liability, the uniqueness of corporations as separate entities has now all but 
disappeared. 
Regardless of whether there are valid policy arguments on the side 
of those who argue for limiting or eliminating limited liability, 
developments in the law of business entities over the last few decades have 
                                                     
* Mr. Clark and Ms. Hickok are partners with Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Philadelphia, PA. Mr. 
Clark is the author of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation discussed in Part IV. 
 1. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2010). 
 2. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (enacted Mar. 
4, 1977) (codified at WYO. STAT. §§ 17-29-101 to -1105). 
 3. “C corporations are separately taxable entities under the IRC. Thus, C corporation earnings 
are subject to double taxation–first at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level upon 
distribution of dividends.” Byron F. Egan, Choice of Entity Alternatives, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 379, 415 
(2004). See also Christopher Beam, Why Do We Tax Corporations?, SLATE (Oct. 17, 2008, 6:02 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/10/why_do_we_tax_corporations. 
html [https://perma.cc/DVY2-FY4G]. 
 4. Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative 
Primer (Part Two), 37 S.D. L. REV. 467, 469–72, 489 (1992). 
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resulted in pervasive limited liability and, along with that, characterization 
of all types of business organizations as entities. In Part II we review 
briefly how limited liability and separate entity status have become the 
norm for all forms of business entities created under state law. 
Almost completely missing, however, from the legislative initiatives 
that have led to the triumph of limited liability and separate entity status is 
any consideration of whether these changes have been accompanied by a 
proper allocation of benefits and burdens between the state and the  
now-pervasive limited liability/separate identity entities. Originally, 
corporations compensated the state for at least part of the cost of the 
externalities created by the corporations through their liability as separate 
taxpayers.5 The spread of limited liability and separate identity has been 
accompanied by changes in tax law,6 which means that essentially all 
privately owned businesses have the ability to organize in such a way that 
they are exempt from taxation as a separate entity, thus leaving the state 
to shoulder the responsibility for community building and reduction in 
externalities.7 In Part III, we begin with a discussion of the debate between 
two competing legal theories of the corporation and whether that debate 
remains relevant. We then move to a broader discussion of the basis on 
which society should require responsible behavior from businesses as the 
price of limited liability and separate identity. We close in Part IV by 
offering the benefit corporation form as a better way of understanding how 
society should expect business to be conducted. 
I. IS LIMITED LIABILITY SOCIALLY BENEFICIAL? 
The debate about whether limited liability is socially beneficial has 
been going on for a long time. As early as 1911, Nicholas Murray Butler, 
the President of Columbia University, said, “I weigh my words when I say 
that in my judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest single 
discovery of modern times. . . . Even steam and electricity are far less 
important than the limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced 
to comparative impotence without it.”8 More recently, Henry Manne 
argued that limited liability is critical to the widespread use of the publicly 
held corporation because it assures investors that they are not placing their 
                                                     
 5. Beam, supra note 3. For a brief discussion of the corporate tax and shareholder tax see also, 
Egan, supra note 3, at 415–16. 
 6. William J. Rands, Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled Differences Under Federal 
Tax Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 15, 17–18, 19 n.9 (1995). 
 7. See generally Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1459, 1460 (1998); Egan, supra note 3. 
 8. Roger E. Meiners, James S. Mofsky & Robert D. Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited 
Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 351 (1979) (alteration in original) (quoting WILLIAM MEADE 
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 21 (1917)). 
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personal assets at risk when they buy a share in a corporation.9 And, 
Richard Posner argued that limited liability facilitated credit transactions 
and that, absent limited liability, “the supply of investment and the demand 
for credit might be much smaller than they are.”10 Both Manne and Posner 
noted that under the rule of limited liability involuntary creditors might 
suffer, but they found the benefits of the rule outweighed the undesirable 
situation of tort creditors.11 Roger Meiners, James Mofsky, and Robert 
Tollison subsequently questioned whether Manne and Posner were correct 
and argued that limited liability does not reduce transaction costs for 
investors and also does not impose unwarranted costs on involuntary 
creditors.12 
On the other side of the issue are scholars who continue to argue that 
the availability of limited liability should be eliminated, or at least 
regulated, if it proves too difficult to place effective limits on its 
availability. A fairly recent example of those who would restrict limited 
liability are Stephanie Blankenburg and Dan Plesch, who wrote in 2007: 
Limited liability is at the heart of this rise of corporate power: it 
constitutes a blanket exemption of a special-interest group from 
accountability for the actions of their companies. While the mantra 
of “no rights without responsibilities” is used to regulate the behavior 
of poor people who benefit from social-security payments, “the 
unaccountable few” enjoy feudal privileges. Owner-shareholders 
(and by extension manager-directors) are beyond the law to an extent 
not enjoyed by the central committees of communist parties, similar 
to the despotic monarchies, dictators and tribal leaders over which 
liberal western societies claim moral superiority, and akin to the 
aristocracy in the ancient regimes of pre-enlightenment Europe. 
Adam Smith, the brilliant economist and guru of free-marketeers, 
was also a staunch opponent of limited liability. In 1776, he wrote: 
“To establish a joint stock company [shareholding corporation], 
however, for any undertaking, merely because such a company might 
be capable of managing it successfully; or to exempt a particular set 
of dealers from some of the general laws which take place with 
regard to all their neighbours, merely because they might be capable 
of thriving if they had such an exemption, would certainly not be 
reasonable.” Smith’s objection – carefully omitted from the praise 
                                                     
 9. See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 
259, 262–63 (1967). 
 10. Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
499, 503 (1976). 
 11. See Manne, supra note 9, at 263; Posner, supra note 10, at 519–24. 
 12. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 8, at 351. 
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heaped on him by free-marketeers with no worries about corporate 
power – makes a simple but powerful point: a democratic and free 
society should not exempt some people from general laws simply 
because their business may thrive as a result. 
If equality before the law is to have any meaning, it must apply to 
human beings, not fictitious persons, and organisations must not be 
handed blanket exemptions from accountability simply on the 
grounds that they can thrive through privilege. We cannot, on the one 
hand, treat corporations as if they were just any person, and on the 
other, invest them with unequal protection. Otherwise, we are guilty 
of a double blindness to power: disregarding it by setting human 
beings equal to powerful corporations before the law, and 
disregarding it again by granting special-interest protection to the 
powerful through limited liability.13 
Additionally, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have argued that 
the court-fashioned remedy of piercing the corporate veil strikes a balance 
between the benefits of limited liability and excessive risk taking.14 But, 
veil piercing is only close to being an effective remedy in the context of 
closely held corporations.15 
Although interesting from the theoretical perspective of what is the 
best public policy, the debate about the desirability of limited liability has 
become largely irrelevant as a practical matter because of the spread of 
limited liability that we discuss in the next section. 
II. THE TRIUMPH OF LIMITED LIABILITY 
A. The Spread of Limited Liability in Recent Decades 
In the last few decades, there has been a pronounced movement away 
from restricting limited liability to corporations, and limited liability is 
now available for every type of business entity. Consistent with the 
aggregate theory of partnership, which sees a general partnership as a 
collection of individuals doing business together, the partners in a general 
                                                     
 13. Stephanie Blankenburg & Dan Plesch, Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Restoring 
Legal Accountability, OPENDEMOCRACY (May 9, 2007) (first alteration in original) (emphasis added), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/corporate_responsibilities_ 
4605.jsp [https://perma.cc/NG8K-FTG8]. For a scholarly explication of the authors’ views, see 
Stephanie Blankenburg, Dan Plesch & Frank Wilkinson, Limited Liability and the Modern 
Corporation in Theory and in Practice, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 821 (2010). 
 14. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (1985). 
 15. Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1, 9 (1997) (“Piercing occurs only within corporate groups or in close corporations 
with fewer than ten shareholders.”). 
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partnership were personally liable for its obligations.16 Section 15 of the 
Uniform Partnership Act (1914), which made all of the partners in a 
general partnership personally liable for all of its debts and obligations, 
was the unquestioned rule in the U.S. for close to eighty years.17 But, the 
rise of limited liability partnerships in the 1990s18 made a profound change 
in the nature of a general partnership. 
When limited liability partnerships were first authorized by the 
states, they provided only a partial liability shield for the partners: the 
partners were not personally liable for torts they were not involved in, but 
they remained liable for the non-tort obligations of the partnership.19In 
1997, the Uniform Partnership Act was amended to provide a full shield 
for partners in a general partnership. 
The change to a full shield followed a trend that had already begun 
in some states. Most states have now adopted the full shield approach 
introduced in the 1997 revision of the Uniform Partnership Act20 and it is 
to be expected that the remaining states will follow suit in the next few 
years. As a result, a general partnership—in which the general partners 
remain personally liable for its debts and obligations—is becoming a 
rarity21 and usually reflects a situation in which the partners have sought 
counsel on this issue or are not concerned about their personal liability 
because of the nature of the partnership’s business. 
Traditionally, limited partnerships provided partial, but not 
complete, liability protection for the partners. The general partners 
remained personally liable and subject to the same rules as applied to 
partners in a general partnership.22 Limited partners were given a liability 
shield, but it did not apply to liabilities to a third party who reasonably 
believed while dealing with the partnership that a limited partner was a 
general partner.23 Both of those limitations on limited liability have now 
been removed. The liability shield for limited partners is now absolute in 
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,24 and limited partnerships are now 
                                                     
 16. Nature of Partner’s Liability, UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 15 (1914). 
 17. See id.; see also Hamill, supra note 7. 
 18. See Kern Alexander, Lessons from the Rise of the US Limited Liability Partnership: 
Regulating Risk-taking in the Large Professional Firm, 6–7 (ESRC Ctr. for Bus. Res., Univ. of 
Cambridge, Working Paper No. 255, 2010); Hamill, supra note 7. 
 19. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-306 (1999). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (1985); General Partner’s Liability, UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT  
§ 404 (2013). 
 23. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 303. 
 24. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306 (2001) (amended 2013); UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (2001) 
(amended 2013) (“An obligation of a limited partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, or 
otherwise, is not the obligation of a limited partner. A limited partner is not personally liable, directly 
or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, for an obligation of the limited partnership solely 
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able to elect to be limited liability limited partnerships which has the effect 
of giving the general partner(s) a liability shield.25 
Ever since their first invention in 1977, limited liability companies 
have provided that the owners of the company, known as “members,” were 
entitled to the same liability shield as shareholders in a corporation.26 
All forms of partnerships have also been redefined as entities.27 The 
rejection of the aggregate theory of partnerships was the subject of debate 
for many years.28 But when the aggregate theory was rejected, the change 
came very quickly and with little detailed explanation. The 
recommendation that led to the change came from a committee of the  
ABA Business Law Section. In a report issued in 1987, that committee 
concluded—in largely conclusory fashion and with virtually no analysis—
as follows: 
Because the “entity theory” avoids a number of technical problems, 
such as the authority of a general partnership to sue or be sued in its 
partnership name, the subcommittee determined that it should be 
incorporated into any revision of the UPA whenever possible and that 
the “aggregate theory” should be retained only where it appears to be 
essential, e.g., because of tax considerations.29 
Today, limited liability and separate entity status are taken so much 
for granted as a part of entity law that they have even been extended to 
unincorporated nonprofit associations, which are the effective equivalent 
                                                     
by reason of being a limited partner, even if the limited partner participates in the management and 
control of the limited partnership.”). 
 25. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(c) (1997) (amended 2013) (“An obligation of a limited partnership 
incurred while the limited partnership is a limited liability limited partnership, whether arising in 
contract, tort, or otherwise, is solely the obligation of the limited partnership. A general partner is not 
personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, for such an obligation 
solely by reason of being or acting as a general partner.”). 
 26. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 304(a) (2006) (amended 2013) (“The debts, obligations, or other 
liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise: (1) are solely 
the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of the company; and (2) do not become the debts, obligations, 
or other liabilities of a member or manager solely by reason of the member acting as a member or 
manager acting as a manager.”). 
 27. United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448 (1973) (stating that for [the purpose of calculating 
partnership income], the partnership is regarded as an independently recognizable entity apart from 
the aggregate of its partners. Once its income is ascertained and reported, its existence may be 
disregarded since each partner must pay tax on a portion of the total income as if the partnership were 
merely an agent or conduit through which the income passed); see also WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., 
FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 1.02[3] (2d ed. 1990). 
 28. See generally Jeremy E. Goldstein & John Goode, Entity and Aggregate Theories of 
Partnership: The Need for Clarification, 1 PROB. & PROP. 15 (1987). 
 29. UPA Revision Subcomm. of the Comm. on P’ships & Unincorporated Bus. Orgs., Should 
the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised?, 43 BUS. LAW. 121, 124 (1987). 
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of nonprofit partnerships.30 The Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit 
Association Act now defines nonprofit associations as entities31 and 
provides that the members of a nonprofit association have limited 
liability.32 
B. The Relationship Among Limited Liability, Separate  
Entity Status, and Taxation 
The extension of entity status to general partnerships is particularly 
surprising because it was not accompanied by a change in how 
partnerships are taxed. Originally, the fact that corporations were 
considered a separate legal person meant that it was also easy to see 
corporations as separate taxpayers.33 Partnerships, on the other hand, 
which were not considered a separate entity, were not seen as a taxpayer 
separate from the partners.34 The result was that partnerships were exempt 
from the double taxation that applied to corporations in which the profits 
of the corporation were first taxed in the hands of the corporation and then, 
when a dividend of some of the remaining profits was paid to the 
shareholders, the profits were taxed again as income to the shareholders.35 
The system under which corporations were taxed separately was 
logically consistent with the separate entity status of corporations and 
meant that the corporation was compensating society in exchange for the 
privileges of limited liability and separate entity status.36 The link between 
limited liability, separate entity status, and separate status as a taxpayer 
was severed some time ago for smaller corporations that were eligible for 
taxation as “S corporations.”37 But the special s-corp status was subject to 
                                                     
 30. ABA NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, ABA REPORT, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/intlaw/leadership/policy/Uniform_Unincorpo
rated_Nonprofit_Association_Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SK3-HR2V]. 
 31. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 5(a) (2008) (amended 2013) (“An 
unincorporated nonprofit association is an entity distinct from its members and managers.”). 
 32. Id. § 8(a) (“A debt, obligation, or other liability of an unincorporated nonprofit association 
is solely the debt, obligation, or other liability of the association. A member or manager is not 
personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise for a debt, obligation, or 
other liability of the association solely by reason of being or acting as a member or manager. This 
subsection applies regardless of the dissolution of the association.”). 
 33. See, e.g., In re Fed.-Mogul Glob. Inc., 411 B.R. 148, 164 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (“[T]he basic 
principle of corporate law that corporations are independent legal ‘persons,’ who, like natural persons, 
may sue and be sued.”); William J. Rands, Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled Differences 
Under Federal Tax Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 15, 17–18 (1995). 
 34. Sole Proprietorships, Partnerships and LLCs Are Commonly Used Entities, BIZFILINGS  
(Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.bizfilings.com/toolkit/sbg/tax-info/fed-taxes/sole-proprietorships-arent-
separate-tax-entities.aspx [https://perma.cc/QV7N-XHL5]. 
 35. 14A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 6953 (2016). 
 36. Beam, supra note 3. 
 37. The History and Challenges of America’s Dominant Business Structure, S-CORP.ORG, 
http://s-corp.org/our-history/ [https://perma.cc/2227-RZYW]. 
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restrictions38 that limited its utility and was not as beneficial to the owners 
of a business as the manner in which partnerships were taxed. 
The spread of limited liability and separate entity status to forms of 
unincorporated business entities that are not considered separate taxpayers 
means that our system of entity law no longer imposes any price on a 
business in exchange for the grant of limited liability and separate entity 
status. Those benefits are now conferred by the state essentially free of 
charge, except for the nominal filing fees required when an entity is first 
formed and when it files its annual reports with the Secretary of State or 
other filing office.39 
The universal availability of limited liability—with both its benefits 
and limitations—raises the question whether the states—and traditional 
corporations—have been shortchanged by the rise of entities that do not 
pay for externalities nor foster social benefit, because they are not subject 
to double taxation, and yet receive the benefits of limited liability and 
separate identity. The answer, as we suggest in Part IV, is that society 
would be justified in repricing the grant of limited liability and separate 
entity status by requiring responsible behavior from the entities it creates. 
III. IS THERE STILL MODERN RELEVANCE TO AN OLD DEBATE? 
Among the many ways that people have characterized corporations 
and the role of the law that governs them are the “contractarian”40 and 
“concession”41 theories. The contractarian theory sees a corporation as a 
contractual entity and sees corporate law as facilitating the contracting 
process that creates a corporation.42 Stefan J. Padfield characterizes those 
viewing corporations as a nexus of contracts as having a 
laissez-faire approach to corporate regulation [because] the 
corporation [is] a contract that suffers primarily, if not solely, from 
agency problems in terms of maximizing utility-agency problems 
that are best solved by elevating shareholder wealth maximization as 
the primary directive of corporate directors and letting shareholders 
and management battle it out over the terms of their contract as they 
                                                     
 38. These restrictions include imposition of ongoing fees, confinement to one class of stock, 
restriction to 100 shareholders, closer IRS scrutiny, and less flexibility in allocating income and loss. 
S Corporation Advantages and Disadvantages, BIZFILINGS, http://www.bizfilings.com/learn/s-
corporation-advantages-and-disadvantages.aspx [https://perma.cc/VH2R-BR69]. 
 39. See, e.g., Annual Report and Tax Instructions, STATE OF DELAWARE, https://corp.delaware. 
gov/paytaxes.shtml. 
 40. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31 
J. CORP. L. 799 (2016). 
 41. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 85 
(1991). 
 42. Klausner, supra note 40, at 782. 
506 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:497 
see fit, subject only to default rules provided by the state for those 
situations where bargaining is too costly or simply overlooked.43 
To the extent conducting business in the corporate form creates 
negative externalities, the contractarian advocates that regulatory 
responses be limited to generally applicable laws.44 
Antony Page and Robert Katz posit that Corporate Social 
Responsibility reflects the contractarian view and relies on “extralegal 
strategies such as self-regulation, external monitoring, and consumer 
activism”45 to push corporations to make decisions that are beneficial to 
society and relegating government to authorizing corporate philanthropy 
and consideration of nonshareholder interests.46 They characterize the 
social enterprise movement as compatible with what they term the “more 
libertarian” contractarian understanding of corporate law.47 
The concession theory, in contrast, sees a corporation as the creation 
of the state, exercising delegated authority.48 Padfield associates the 
concession view with those who fear corporate power.49 This fear plays 
out in a characterization of Frankenstein-like corporations whose mindless 
and amoral power must be restrained. This characterization is implied in 
the dissent of Justice Stevens in Citizens United, who posits that 
corporations have “been effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring 
society’s economic welfare,” but they “have no consciences, no feelings, 
no thoughts, no desires.”50 
In Padfield’s view, the regulatory response of those holding a 
“concession” or progressive view of corporations will “conform corporate 
law to the shifting cultural and social norms of the time.”51 This, so the 
argument goes, is because the state grants a corporation its existence, 
defines its attributes, and dictates the terms and conditions on which it can 
persist, and thus should be entitled to guide the corporation, just as in the 
early days when charters were granted so that corporations could promote 
                                                     
 43. Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation: More than a Nexus-of-Contracts, 114 W. 
VA. L. REV. 209, 220 (2011) (internal quotations omitted). 
 44. Id. at 221. 
 45. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1376–77 (2011). 
 46. See id. 
 47. See id. at 1379. 
 48. Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 20 (2015). 
 49. Padfield, supra note 43, at 221. 
 50. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 465–66 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). Padfield characterizes Justice Stevens’s dissent in Citizens United as embodying 
concession theory (even though Justice Stevens himself disclaimed any reliance on corporate law 
theory). See Padfield, supra note 48, at 226. 
 51. Padfield, supra note 48, at 214. 
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specific pro-social goals.52 Page and Katz similarly characterize 
progressive (concession) corporate law as a way to restructure corporate 
law and to alter the decision-makers.53 
In actuality, however, both historically and currently, the view of 
corporate law as a contract carries with it an understanding of fixed terms 
and vested rights.54 As early as the Marshall Court and its decision in 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,55 the charter of a corporation 
was recognized as a contract and thus subject to the protection of the 
Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.56 In other words, the 
contractarian view limits the power of the State vis-à-vis the entities it 
creates—a more Frankenstein vision than any view of corporate law as a 
concession. As the U. S. Supreme Court explained in Beer Company v. 
Massachusetts: 
Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and 
boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it may be to 
render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that 
it does extend to the protection of the lives, health, and property of 
the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public 
morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the 
power to provide for these objects. They belong emphatically to that 
class of objects which demand the application of the maxim, salus 
populi suprema lex; and they are to be attained and provided for by 
such appropriate means as the legislative discretion may devise. That 
discretion can no more be bargained away than the power itself.57 
Because the concession theory is grounded in an understanding that 
the state concedes a role to corporations and other limited liability entities, 
                                                     
 52. Id. at 217. 
 53. Page & Katz, supra note 45, at 1376–77. 
 54. See, e.g., Miller v. The State, 82 U.S. 478, 488 (1872). 
Corporate franchises, granted to private corporations, if duly accepted by the corporators, 
partake of the nature of legal estates, and the grant, under such circumstances, if it be 
absolute in its terms, and without any condition or reservation, importing a different 
intent, becomes a contract within the protection of that clause of the Constitution which 
ordains that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Charters of 
private corporations are regarded as executed contracts between the State and the 
corporators, and the rule is well settled that the legislature, if the charter does not contain 
any reservation or other provision modifying or limiting the nature of the contract, cannot 
repeal, impair, or alter such a charter against the consent or without the default of the 
corporation, judicially ascertained and declared. Subsequent legislation, altering or 
modifying such a charter, where there is no such reservation, is plainly unauthorized, if it 
is prejudicial to the rights of the corporators, and was passed without their consent. 
Id. 
 55. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877). 
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it recognizes that state law is enacted in light of its overarching obligation 
to provide for its citizens—a view of both the state and limited liability 
entities that allows for the evolution of both social values and entity 
responses. Such a view does not require the added leap that corporations 
are avaricious and otherwise amoral, the perspective apparently held by 
Justice Stevens. Indeed, much of what is positive in this  
country—historically and currently—is the result of corporate innovation 
and productivity, and, to the extent the motivation for that has been profits 
for the corporation and its investors, those profits are well-earned. The 
caveat to that value, however, is that if the state is being forced to 
underwrite externalities or strain the social fabric attributable to the 
business (whether from environmental degradation, a refusal to employ 
full-time, benefit-eligible workers, or otherwise), part of the profits 
properly belong to the state and not the company or its investors. 
In other words, drawing on a more benign view of concession theory, 
a state can act from its respect for the value corporate flexibility can bring 
rather than from a fear of corporate power, which in turn calls for 
empowering procedural regulation rather than constraining substantive 
regulation. As states face changing needs and mores, the entity forms 
provided by the states for the organization of businesses can adapt to meet 
those changes better and can more properly be asked to meet those changes 
if they are seen as operating pursuant to a state concession rather than 
under the contractarian view. 
Justice Stevens’s perspective hearkens back to a belief that Berle 
espoused: if corporate managers had a fiduciary duty to many masters, 
they would be effectively unconstrained.58 Although Berle would later 
revise this view somewhat, there is an intuitive sense—dating back to 
scripture—that a person cannot serve multiple masters.59 But that is 
precisely the problem with framing corporate responsibility in terms of 
loyalty to and care for someone. Fiduciary duties presuppose that a 
confidential relationship exists that permits a beneficiary to repose trust in 
a trustee to place the beneficiary’s interest above all others.60 
While it is true that the 1960 Act does not, like the statutes cited in 
that case, expressly subject the Government to duties of management 
and conservation, the fact that the property occupied by the United 
States is expressly subject to a trust supports a fair inference that an 
obligation to preserve the property improvements was incumbent on 
                                                     
 58. See A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1365, 1367 (1932). 
 59. Matthew 6:24. 
 60. See Fiduciary Duty, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ 
fiduciary_duty [https://perma.cc/L5AR-R6A6]. 
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the United States as trustee. This is so because elementary trust law, 
after all, confirms the commonsense assumption that a fiduciary 
actually administering trust property may not allow it to fall into ruin 
on his watch. One of the fundamental common-law duties of a trustee 
is to preserve and maintain trust assets.61 
Dominant or controlling shareholders, we held, are “fiduciar[ies] 
whose powers are powers [held] in trust.” We then explained: Their 
dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and 
where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is 
challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to 
prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent 
fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested 
therein. . . . The essence of the test is whether or not under all the 
circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length 
bargain. If it does not, equity will set it aside. 62 
Instead, limited liability entities should be empowered and 
encouraged to recognize that there is a Venn diagram of categories of 
benefits to the citizens of a state; a limited liability entity should be at least 
encouraged to—and perhaps required to—choose what maximizes either 
the overlap of them all or the intersection of the areas the limited liability 
entity deems the most important. If, for example, a company provides 
additional benefits to its employees, including, perhaps, tuition for them 
and their families, the company will be providing benefits to the 
community as well. The converse holds true as well: if a corporation 
demonstrates a commitment to the community it inhabits, that will benefit 
the employees who live there. The same can be said of a company 
committed to reducing externalities, whether by buying locally, shifting to 
sustainable energy sources, or sponsoring cleanup of degraded resources. 
With all due respect to Justice Stevens, core corporate law theory 
presupposes that corporations can and do make such choices. At the least, 
a corporation is expected to (i) understand and refrain from unlawful or 
tortious activity;63 (ii) understand and strategically address market input;64 
                                                     
 61. United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003). 
 62. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 346–47 (2010) (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 
U.S. 295 (1939)). 
 63. See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CYBER LAW § 2, at 868 (Wolters Kluwer 
2016) (“Tort law is a branch of the law of civil obligations, where the legal persons, both natural 
persons and corporations have legal obligations to refrain from harm to another person . . . .”). 
 64. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 371, 390–92 (1937) (“The main 
reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism. . . . [T]he operation of a market costs something and by forming an organization and 
allowing some authority (an ‘entrepreneur’) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are 
saved.”). 
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and (iii) make decisions in line with constituents’ values.65 It is now time 
for society to make clear that in return for the grant of limited liability and 
perpetual existence, business entities are expected to act responsibly and 
sustainably. 
The preceding discussion has suggested that there is a basis in both 
the contractarian concession theories to require responsible behavior by 
corporations. It is good that both theories support such a requirement 
because the differences between the theories lose their relevance when 
applied to unincorporated entities. Unincorporated entities are universally 
regarded as arising primarily from the contract made by the owners of the 
business to conduct business together.66 But even in the context of entities 
created principally by private contract, there is a basis for the state to 
expect certain norms of behavior. 
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW PARADIGM 
Beginning in 2010 with the enactment of the first benefit corporation 
law in Maryland,67 there has been an increasing recognition that society 
would benefit from authorizing businesses to conduct their operations in a 
responsible and sustainable manner. There are now thirty-one jurisdictions 
in the United States68 and one foreign country (Italy)69 that have authorized 
corporations that have the characteristics described below. Although they 
are sometimes called by different names in different states,70 we refer to 
them in this discussion by the most commonly used name of “benefit 
corporations.” 
Benefit corporations share three main characteristics: 
1. The purpose of the corporation is redefined as being “triple 
bottom line,” meaning that in addition to the usual purpose of a 
business corporation to be financially profitable, the corporation 
also has a purpose of creating “a material positive impact on 
                                                     
 65. See William M. Lafferty et al., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors 
Under Delaware Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 841 (2012). 
 66. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rationalizing Entity Law: Corporate Law and Alternative 
Entities (Part II), BUS. L. TODAY, Dec. 2013, at 3. (“[F]reedom of contract in the LLC form should 
still be able to operate in much the way that the DLLCA now provides . . . . Informed venturers with 
legal capacity should be able to enter into valid and binding contracts that vary statutory or common 
law duties. They may have other ways of supplying the trust needed to engage in business together.”). 
 67. MD. CODE ANN., Corps & Ass’ns § 5-6C-03 (West 2012). 
 68. Frederick H. Alexander, The Capital Markets and Benefit Corporations, BUS. L. TODAY, 
July 2016. 
 69. ALISSA PELATAN & ROBERTO RANDAZZO, THE FIRST EUROPEAN BENEFIT CORPORATION: 
BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN “SOCIAL” AND “BUSINESS”, http://www.bwbllp.com/file/benefit-
corporation-article-june-16-pdf [https://perma.cc/P5TL-VBX8]. 
 70. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 362 (2015) (“Public Benefit Corporation”); HAW. REV. 
STAT. §§ 420d-1 to 420d-13 (2011) (“Sustainable Business Corporation”). 
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society and the environment, taken as a whole, form its business 
and operations.”71 That statement of the expanded purpose of a 
benefit corporation is taken from the Model Benefit Corporation 
Legislation that has been the basis for most of the statutes 
enacted by the states.72 To the same effect is the requirement in 
the Delaware statute that a benefit corporation “operate in a 
responsible and sustainable manner.”73 
2. The duties of the directors are redefined to require them to 
consider the interests of the nonfinancial stakeholders of the 
corporation in addition to the interests of the shareholders.74 
3. The corporation is subject to a new requirement to report on its 
pursuit of its expanded purpose.75 The purpose of this 
requirement is to supplement the financial statements of the 
corporation so that the shareholders have a full picture of the 
triple bottom line performance of the corporation and not just its 
financial performance. 
As noted above, Italy has joined the trend in the United States to 
authorize benefit corporations.76 More broadly, there is an increasing 
interest internationally in encouraging businesses to operate in a more 
responsible manner.77 A notable example is the Social Impact Investment 
Taskforce established under the UK’s presidency of the G8.78 That 
taskforce was supported by four working groups, one of which was the 
Mission Alignment Working Group.79 That working group prepared a 
detailed set of recommendations for how countries could promote 
                                                     
 71. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2016) (“general public benefit”). 
 72. See, e.g., The Model Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-
legislation [https://perma.cc/U38K-TURE] (explaining Delaware passed benefit corporation 
legislation in July 2013, and offering more information about the Delaware benefit corporation statute 
and how it compares to the model statute). 
 73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 362(a) (2015). 
 74. Benefit Corporation Director Duties, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/ 
businesses/benefit-corporation-director-duties [https://perma.cc/22E3-V3KS]. 
 75. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401 (2016) (“Benefit Director”). 
 76. PELATAN & RANDAZZO, supra note 69. 
 77. See Business in Society: Making a Positive and Responsible Contribution, INT’L CHAMBER 
COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/trade-facilitation/9-steps-to-responsible-
business-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/RM4D-K3GL]. 
 78. Social Impact Investment Taskforce, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
groups/social-impact-investment-taskforce [https://perma.cc/29ZF-EBHU]. The Taskforce was 
superseded by the Global Social Impact Investment Steering Group. Global Social Impact Investment 
Steering Group, SOC. IMPACT INV., http://www.socialimpactinvestment.org [https://perma.cc/J8B9-
RE6E]. 
 79. See Social Impact Investment Taskforce, supra note 78. 
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businesses with a broader purpose.80 Recommendation 6 urges countries 
to promote the organization of businesses with the three characteristics 
described above.81 Recommendation 2 provides that those characteristics 
“should be available under each of the basic legal forms that may be used 
in the country to organize a business.”82 While the focus of the taskforce 
was on social impact businesses, rather than business generally, 
Recommendation 20 urges countries to encourage the growth and funding 
of businesses that, more broadly, are seeking to create a positive impact 
on society and the environment.83 
The recommendation of the G8 taskforce that all forms of business 
entity should be able to seek to create positive impacts on society and the 
environment84 is already being implemented in the United States. There is 
the start of a movement to extend the benefit corporation form beyond 
corporations to unincorporated entities. Maryland, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania have authorized the creation of limited liability companies, 
called “benefit companies,” which mimic the benefit corporation form and 
have the three characteristics described above.85 
It is customary to refer to Milton Friedman and his classic article 
“The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits”86 for the 
proposition that a business should be focused solely on maximizing its 
financial performance for the benefit of its owners. But in that article, 
Friedman makes the following comment: 
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is 
an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct 
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the 
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to 
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules 
of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in 
ethical custom.87  
Thus, even in Friedman’s view, there is room for society’s ethical 
customs to influence how business is to be conducted. 
                                                     
 80. See SOC. IMPACT INV. TASKFORCE, MISSION ALIGNMENT WORKING GRP, PROFIT-WITH-
PURPOSE BUSINESSES (2014), http://www.socialimpactinvestment.org/reports/Mission%20 
Alignment%20WG%20paper%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TNR-4FSW] [hereinafter MISSION 
ALIGNMENT PAPER]. 
 81. See id. at 21. 
 82. See id. at 19–20. 
 83. See id. at 28–29. 
 84. See id. at 23–24. 
 85. See, e.g., Maryland Proposes the Benefit LLC, CHANGEMATTERS (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://changematters.com/2011/03/benefit-llc/. 
 86. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine). 
 87. Id. (emphasis added). 
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United States entity law has developed to a state in which all business 
entities have available to them limited liability that accompanies separate 
existence as a legal entity. But most entities are now not obligated to pay 
for their externalities and are not expected to prioritize or address the needs 
of the larger community as part of a social bargain for entity privileges. 
We propose that such a bargain is a fair and necessary one. Entities should 
be expected to engage in responsible and sustainable behavior as the price 
for limited liability and separate entity status. And benefit corporations 
demonstrate the viability of such an expectation. 
